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This paper addresses the tragic events of September 11th, 2001. 
Provides a brief background on the philosophy of fire protection for 
high-rise buildings and the behavior of a fire within a compartment. It 
further describes the events and the particular scenario corresponding 
to the World Trade Center. No attempt is made of providing a 
description of what caused the collapse but the objective is more to 
illustrate the characteristics of the fire and highlight the possible 
uncertainties. The paper concludes with a list of lessons learned and 
questions yet to be answer but fundamentally, with a plea for a 
detailed analysis of this event and a subsequent plan for fire research. 
Understanding the mechanisms that led to the collapse of the World 
Trade Center will enable engineers to provide a safer environment for 
the users of similar and other types of buildings but also for the 




From the perspective of a Fire protection Engineer, the design of a 
building can be approached in two different ways. The first is for the building to 
comply with existing regulations, and the second one is to achieve certain safety 
goals. Regulations have not been developed to fully specify the design of unique 
and complex buildings such as the World Trade Center and even, in the event 
that they existed, they are of questionable effectiveness. Furthermore, if a 
scenario such as the one of September 11th, 2001 needs to be considered as a 
possible event during the life of the building, design on the basis of safety goals 
is the only path that can be followed. 
Fire, % Evacuated, % of Total Structural Integrity, etc. 
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Figure 1 Schematic of the sequence of events following the onset of a fire in a multiple 
story building. The thick line corresponds to the “fire size,” the dotted lines to the 
possible outcome of the different forms of intervention (sprinkler activation, fire 
service). The dashed lines are the percentage of people evacuated, with the 
ultimate goal of 100% represented by a horizontal dashed line. The dashed & 
dotted line corresponds to the percentage of the full structural integrity of the 
building. 
 
The schematic presented in Figure 1 could represent the behavior of a 
building in the event of a fire. It could be argued that the safety objective should 
be that the time to evacuation (te) at each compartment (i.e. room of origin, 
floor, building) be much smaller that time necessary to reach untenable 
conditions in the particular compartment (tf). Characteristic values of te and tf 
can be established for different levels of containment, room of origin, floor, 
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building. Furthermore, it is necessary for the evacuation time to be much smaller 











Although these criteria for safety times can be considered as a simplified 
statement, it is clear that it describes well the main goals of fire protection. 
With the objective of achieving these goals a number of safety strategies 
are put in place. These include those strategies that are meant to increase tf 
which include active systems, such as sprinklers, or the intervention of the fire 
service. As shown by Figure 1 (dotted lines), success of these strategies can 
result in control or suppression of the fire. Passive protection such as thermal 
insulation of structural elements becomes part of the design with the purpose of 
increasing tS. Finally, but most important, evacuation protocols and routes are 
design to minimize te at all stages of the building. It is important to note that 
within the estimation of te the safe operations of the firemen need to be included. 
The events following the attack on the World Trade Center showed that 
these safety goals were not attained. It is therefore important to seek the best 
possible understanding of why this happened. For this purpose an adequate 
understanding of the nature of the event and the characteristic of the structure 
and its safety systems is necessary. This paper will attempt to highlight the 
different elements that have to be studied to reach appropriate conclusions, the 
need for an exhaustive investigation of this event and to put in perspective how 
this information can be used for the safety evaluation and design of similar 
buildings. 
Up to now there has been a preliminary investigation conducted by the 
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and sponsored by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It has been dubbed a “building 
performance evaluation”. Their report is scheduled for official release at the end 
of April. The Congress has held one hearing on the status of the investigation 
and is advocating for the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
to conduct a deeper technical investigation, but no funds have been allocated 
yet. Some have advocated for a US national commission (e.g. the Skyscraper 
Safety Campaign, link at www.HeroWTC.org). Agencies with investigative 
mandates such as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the 
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (federal arson) were not involved. 
Hence, the preservation of data and information has not occurred. The recycling 
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sale of the steel from the WTC has upset many (NY Daily News, Jan 17, 2002). 
By the time this paper is presented, we may see the official FEMA report and 
NIST may then be involved. But the sensitivity for urgency in an investigation 
of the cause of the WTC buildings collapses has not been evident. 
2. Data gathering 
2.1. Buildings 
2.1.1. Background on Compartment Fires 
A fire has a significant effect on a structure but the characteristics of the 
compartment that encloses the flames also have an impact on the nature of the 
fire. Temperatures within the compartment and duration of the fire are defined 
by the supply of fuel and oxidizer as well as being affected by heat transfer 
through the compartment boundaries. Fuel generation, in turn is the result of 
energy feedback from the flames. Both thermal and oxygen-limiting feedback 
processes can affect the fire in a compartment. In the course of fire safety design 
or fire investigation in buildings, all of these effects, along with fire growth 
characteristics of the fuel, must be understood. The ability to express the 
relevant physics in approximate mathematics is essential to be able to focus on 
the key elements in a particular situation. The accuracy of such approximate 
analyses are usually sufficient, especially when their consistency is confirmed 
by other information, e.g. witnesses, alarm records, video, etc. 
A fire undergoes a series of processes from its inception, through spread 
and growth to its fully developed stage. A singularity in the growth process is 
the event of “flashover.” Here, “flashover” is defined as a transition, usually 
rapid, in which the fire distinctly grows bigger in the compartment. The “fully-
developed” state is where all of the fuel available is involved to its maximum 
extent according to oxygen or fuel limitations. The growth of a fire is generally 
described through a two-zone model (Figure 2(a)) where the fire through a cold 
lower zone entrains air and products of combustion migrate to an upper layer. 
Pressure in a compartment fire is considered to be atmospheric and flows occur 
at vents due to hydrostatic pressure differences [1,2]. For the scenario of this 
paper, the fully developed fire is of more relevance and is presented in Figure 
2(b). In this case the flow can be modeled via a single zone and the use of the 
ideal gas law in conjunction with conservation of energy and mass. 
The onset of flashover is considered to be induced by thermal effects 
associated with the fuel and its configuration, the ignition source, and the 
thermal feedback of the compartment. A “thermal-runaway” will occur at a 
critical temperature and the result of this critical event will lead to a fully-
developed fire. For the present scenario it seems relevant to assume that the 






Figure 2 Stages of fire growth (a) growth period represented by a two zone model (b) 
fully developed fire represented by a single zone model 
The fully developed compartment fire is defined as the ultimate (not 
always maximum) state of burning and either the fuel available or the ventilation 
determines its characteristics. The fuel available is determined by the burning 
rate and the ventilation is generally defined by a ventilation factor that is 
associated to the size of the openings of the compartment. Although significant 
research has been done to establish the characteristics of fully developed 
compartment fires [3] many questions of relevance to the scenario of the World 
Trade Center still remain with no answer. 
The C.I.B. (International Counsel for Buildings) undertook one of the 
most comprehensive studies on the subject [4]. Wood cribs were used as fuel 
and although this arrangement has particular burning characteristics the 
observations serve to illustrate the main factors controlling a fully developed 
fire. This study used scales of H=0.5 to 1.5 m, and the cribs nearly covered the 
entire floor. The burning rate results are presented in [5]. For wooden cribs in a 
compartment, the area of the vertical shafts of the crib, (HAo/A),crib, and the 
ventilation factor of the compartment, oo HA/A , control the oxygen flow 
through the crib. For limited oxygen the ventilation factor controls the burning 
rate (A0H01/2/A=0.02 m1/2) and a constant burning rate is observed for different 
vertical shaft areas. With sufficient oxygen (A0H01/2/A=0.114 m1/2), the exposed 
surface area of the sticks controls the burning rate and therefore the burning rate 
increases with (HAo/A),crib . 
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Figure 3 Wood crib burning behavior in a compartment based on the total crib 
surface area, from Thomas and Nilsson [5]. 
 
Figure 4 Wood crib burning rate in the CIB study. 
The aspect ratios of the floors in the World Trade Center would have lead 
rapidly to a ventilation-limited state. In this particular condition the burning rate 
of fuel could have been expected to attain an asymptotic steady-state value 
rapidly. Figure 3 shows a plot of the asymptotic burning rates for ventilation 
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limited wood crib fires. As can be noted, the burning rate is strictly dependent 
on the incoming air or ventilation factor. It is important to note that these 
empirical relationships between the burning rate and the ventilation can be 
supported by simple analytical expressions allowing for the calculation of the 
conditions within the compartment. 
If the burning rate can be established then, knowing the heat of 
combustion, the energy release rate can be calculated and thus the temperature 
of the compartment. An element that still remains un-addressed is the fraction of 
the energy that remains within the compartment. 
It is important to consider the conditions that promote the maximum 
possible compartment temperature from a structural fire protection interest. 
Standard structural fire testing exposes elements to about 900 °C in 1 hour and 
up to 1100 °C by 4 hours. The expectation of these standard tests could well be 
defined as providing a worst-case fire scenario. Comparison between a realistic 
scenario and the design constraints can give some insight to the possible 
behavior of the structure. 
The maximum gas temperature will occur under adiabatic and 
stoichiometric conditions, nevertheless, these temperatures, which are available 
in any combustion textbook, might be unrealistically high. Recorded gas 
temperatures near the ceiling are reported as high as 1350 °C [6], and mean 
temperatures over the peak burning period of 1000 to 1200 °C for polyethylene 
fires [6] and about 900 °C to 1200 °C for wood cribs [7]. Figure 5, from Thomas 
and Heselden [7], gives estimates of the temperatures that could be expected for 
wood cribs in small scale (1 m high) compartments. Expressed in terms of the 
ventilation-factor and surface area, the results are hoped to be scale independent. 
However, theory suggests that fuels with higher heats of combustion will give 
higher temperatures, and that scale can affect adiabaticity with a maximum 
















Figure 5 Time mean temperature near the ceiling. Where AT is the total area excluding 
floor an opening, a the window area and H the height of the window. The fuel 
loads for these tests are in the range 20-40 kg/m2 that is smaller but nevertheless 
comparable to what would be expected in a modern office. 
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Different temperature correlations are available for fire plumes [9,10,11] 
which can be established analytically by using an appropriate radiative fraction, 
Xr. From the best available data as the fire diameter increases, the radiative 
fraction falls due to soot blockage [12]. Flame temperature data for turbulent 
plumes as a function of Xr  shows an increase in temperature as Xr decreases. The 
extrapolated adiabatic temperature is about 1500 °C (Xr ≈0) as proposed by 
Thomas [8]. For a large fire in a compartment with large vents, the core 
maximum flame temperature could approach this value. 
The theoretical arguments leading to temperatures of 1500oC remain to be 
validated by appropriate experiments. In a similar way, the experimental values 
presented above are for a limited number of fuels, i.e. wood cribs, and 
discrepancies can be expected with variations in the fuel. Data on other fuels is 
limited for fully developed compartment fires, especially data relevant to a 
combination of liquid fuels and office fuel loads. The absence of this empirical 
information poses a significant limitation to the evaluation of the uncertainty 
involved in any attempted calculation for the World Trade Center scenario. 
2.1.2. Fuel Load 
Based on the above discussion it is important to establish the fuel load 
within the building. There are two sources of fuel, one is the aircraft fuel, and 
the other is the fuel inherent to the building. 
• Aircraft fuel once ignited resulted in a “fire ball” mostly outside of 
the building. The question to be addressed is how much of this fuel 
burn outside, what fraction burned inside and what was its impact 
on the growth of the fire. 
• The fuel within the building could be considered a typical office 
space building. Numbers quoted for this type of office are 
approximately 40-60 kg/m2. 
Except for scale effects, there is no reason to believe that the temperatures 
inside the floor of the WTC fires would be bigger than those given by Figure 5. 
The only area where temperatures could be expected to be slightly higher is the 
area close to the windows where flames projected through openings have been 
found to reach up to 1200 °C [13]. But limited flaming is seen from the WTC 
windows from available videos. To date there has been no systematic archiving 
or review of the video records of this event. Indeed some footage may have been 
suppressed. 
Here it is of importance to add that the outcome of this event should serve 
to encourage us to question the completeness of Figure 5. The analysis of the 
previous section raises the question of how applicable this data could be to a 
scenario such as the World Trade Center, the outcome validates this question 
and pushes us to insist that further research should be conducted. 
NIST is employing their CFD fire code, Fire Dynamics Simulator [14], to 
calculate aspects of the fire. The accuracy of these calculations is questionable 
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since the code has not been validated for such fires, but can and will be an 
indispensable tool if NIST obtains support for the investigation. 
2.1.3. Construction 
The plan area of the two main towers of the building complex formerly 
known as the World Trade Center in New York was quadratic (Figure 6) with 
each side measuring 63.5 meters in length. Each of these towers was 411 meters 
high and contained 110 stories. 
Their uniqueness within the skyline of New York was not only an optical 
but also a technological one. The applied tube construction (Figure 7) is a 
structural form of construction that is optimal for very tall buildings. It provides 
the required strength and stiffness by utilizing: 
• A rigid perimeter frame (framed tube) to carry all wind loads and 
resist all overturning forces, and 
• A coaxial running central core that took solely the gravity loads of 
the building. 
 
Figure 6 Isometric View of WTC [15] 
 
Figure 7 Isometric View of Building [16] 
13 – Perimeter frame 
17 – Core box columns 
20 – Floor 
This principle resulted in a very light and economical structure. It kept the 
wind bracing in the most efficient place (the outside surface of the building) and 
did not transferring the forces, as in most curtain-wall structures, through the 
floor membrane to the core. 
Each of the four 63.5 meters long sides of the plan area quadrate, that 
formed the perimeter frame, consisted of 59 Exterior Box Columns (Figure 8) 
that were spaced on approx. 1 meter center and interconnected. Window glazing 
0.56 m was between each exterior column, and framed by aluminum alloy-
sheathed piers each 0.48 m wide (“Sometime Lofty Towers”). Each of the four 
sides of the perimeter frame were interconnected with their perpendicular 
standing counters sides forming, together with the floors, a momentum rigid 
framed tube that was fixed to the foundation. 
The central core (Figure 9) ran coaxial within the frame tube and spanned 
over a rectangular area of 24 by 42 meters. The core contained 44 Core Box 
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Columns that were designed to carry the vertical loads only, and hosted the 
access and services. 
 
 
Figure 8 Exterior Box 
Column [16] 
36 – Steel column 
38, 39 – Fire resistant plaster 
Figure 9 Plan View of 
Typical Floor [16] 
11, 12 – Lifts 
10 – Open plan offices 
Figure 10 Structural System 
for Typical Floor [16] 
13 – Perimeter frame 
14 – Bar joists 
15 – Secondary joists 
16 – Horizontal floor bracing 
17 – Core box columns 
 
In between the perimeter frame and the central core the floor, constructed 
of prefabricated trussed steel (900 mm deep bar joists), spanned over the full 
18.3 meters, braced by secondary joists (Figure 10). These joists acted as a 
diaphragm to stiffen the outside wall against lateral buckling forces. The 
secondary joists supported a profiled deck on which a 100 mm thick light-
weight concrete was poured. 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 give an additional insight in respect to how the 
structure of the two main towers of the World Trade Center was constructed. 
The floor-truss system was not supported by the columns directly, but was 
connected by bolts and welded flange connectors to the columns. These 
connections would only be able to support the combined load of several floors. 
They may have been the weakest link in the progressive collapse that occurred. 
Passive fire protection was provided to the structure: 
• Possibly by applying vermiculite plaster to the columns, and 
• There is some unconfirmed report of a fire rated suspended ceiling 
to the underside of the floor systems. 
• The steel floor truss system was sprayed with mineral fiber. 
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Figure 11 Isometric View of Floor and 
Exterior Wall System [17] 
 
Figure 12 View of Floor and Exterior Wall 
System from within the building [15] 
2.2. Airplanes 
The two airplanes that were part of the World Trade Center event on 
September 11th , 2001 belonged to the Boeing 767 family. The Boeing 767 
family is a family of airplanes designed to providing maximum market 
versatility in the 200- to 300-seat market range in which the Boeing 767-200 is 
the smallest of it’s kind. 
Table 1 contains the basic technical characteristics of a typical Boeing 
767-200 applicable for the entire range of aircrafts. 
 
Seats 181 – 255 
Cargo 2875 ft3 81.4 m3 
Engines 
• Pratt & Whitney 







Maximum Fuel Capacity 23980 U.S. gal 90770 l 
Maximum Takeoff Weight 395000 lb 179170 kg 
Maximum Range 6600 nautical 
miles 
12220 km 
Typical Cruise Speed at 35,000 feet 530 mph 850 km/h 
Basic Dimensions (Figure 13) 
• Wing Span 
• Overall Length 
• Tail height 
• Interior Cabin Width 
 
156 ft 1 in 
159 ft 2 in 
52 ft 






Table 1 Characteristics of the Boeing 767-200 [18] 
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Figure 13 Basic dimensions of a Boeing 767-200 [18] 
 
The specific characteristics of the two disaster planes can be found in 
Table 2. 
 
Airline United Airlines American Airlines 
Flight Number 175 11 
Aircraft Boeing 767-222 767-223ER 
Registration N612UA N334AA 
People on board at time of accident65 92 
Fatalities 65 92 
Manufacturer Serial Number 21873 22332 
Line Number 41 169 
Engine Manufacturer Pratt & Whitney General Electric 
Engine Model JT9D-7R4D CF6-80A2 
Year of Delivery 1983 1987 
Table 2 Specific airplane information [19] 
2.3. Incidents Facts 
2.3.1. Initiation 
2.3.1.1. North Tower Crash 
On the morning of the 11th September, American Airline’s flight 11, 
operated by a Boeing 767-223ER, departed at 7:59 from Logan International 
Airport in Boston, Massachusetts for a more than 5 hour flight to Los Angeles, 
California. On board the aircraft were 81 passengers (including five hijackers), 
nine flight attendants, and the two pilots. Shortly after its departure, flight AA11 
disappeared from the radar screens of the Federal Aircraft Administration 
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(FAA), and ceased responding to radio calls from air traffic controllers. At 8:45 
the aircraft was flown into the side of the north tower of the World Trade Center 
between the 80th and 90th floor. The speed of the aircraft at impact has been 
estimated at 650 km/h-1. This impact led to a severe structural damage within the 
tower, and collapse occurred 104 minutes later at 10:29. 
2.3.1.2. South Tower Crash 
On the morning of the 11th September, United Airline’s flight 175, 
operated by a Boeing 767-222 departed at 8:14 from Logan International Airport 
in Boston, Massachusetts for a more than 5 hour flight to Los Angeles, 
California. On board the aircraft were 56 passengers (including five hijackers), 
seven flight attendants, and the two pilots. Shortly after its departure, moments 
after its crew had reported suspicious radio transmissions from another flight to 
Boston, Flight 175 disappeared from the Federal Aircraft Administration (FAA) 
radar screens, and ceased responding to radio calls from air traffic controllers. 
At 9:03 the aircraft was flown into the south tower of the World Trade Center, 
between the 65th and 75th floor. The speed of the aircraft at impact has been 
estimated at 650 km/h-1. This impact led to a severe structural damage within the 
tower, and collapse occurred 47 minutes later at 9:50am. 
In terms of mass, each aircraft was estimated as 170 tons, and hit a tower 
weighing about 750,000 tons. This impact is analogous to a 1-ounce sparrow 
hitting a 275-pound person. Indeed, in an article in the NY Times (March 29, 
2002) reporting on a leaked version of the forthcoming FEMA report stated that 
the building had a “remarkable ability to redistribute the load to those [columns] 
that remained intact. This rearrangement was so efficient, the calculation show, 
that stresses on columns no more than 20 feet from the hole punched in the 
tower’s face were barely higher than what they were before the impact.” 
A sequence of images that describe the South Tower impact and the fire 
that followed the North Tower crash is presented in Figure 14. These images 
were extracted from reference [19]. 
2.3.2. Response 
We will not elaborated in detail on the fire fighter response since 
Firehouse magazine does a very good job at relating the facts and issues (April, 
2002) [20]. Following the impact of the second aircraft, the first recall of the 
entire NY City fire department in more than 50 years was made. This was more 
that 11,000 uniformed personnel involving 203 engine companies and 143 
ladder companies. In the collapses, 343 fire fighters were lost and 25 engines 
and 15 ladder companies were destroyed. The situation quickly became one of 
rescue, since the water system had likely been destroyed and suppression was 
not viable. Additional issues were the cross flow paths on the stairways between 
the fire fighters and the occupants, height limited radio communications and 
other factors. It is indicated that firefighters were being told to evacuate about 
25 minutes before the North Tower collapsed ([20], p.94). Before the collapse, 
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firefighters experienced warnings: “Suddenly the building started to shake.” 
(Ibid, p 86), “the building shook violently, damn near knocked you off your feet. 
You could hear a faint sound of a rumble. … It lasted maybe about four seconds 
and then it go quiet and lighting went out and the emergency lighting came on.” 
(Ibid, p.81). A coordinated timeline of these indications could be invaluable in 
determining the nature and cause of the collapses. 
 
 (a)  (b) 
 (c)  (d) 




Figure 14 Different images presenting the 
South Tower impact and the fire 
that followed the North Tower 
crash 
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3. Fire characteristics 
3.1. Burning Behavior 
Much can be speculated on the way burning occurred throughout this 
event, nevertheless it seems clear that the intensity of this fire was not much 
different than that of other high rise fires (First Interstate Bank Building (Los 
Angeles) or Meridian Plaza Building (Philadelphia)). These others did not lead 
to collapse, yet the Meridian Plaza had severe damage and had to be 
demolished. It is clear that in the evaluation of the WTC fire it is important to 
consider the contribution that the different fuel sources might have had. 
The aircraft fuel has been singled out as being the origin of an “unusually 
hot” fire, but these statements can be challenged on the basis of plume fire 
temperatures that are weakly affected by fuel type, and on the overall role of the 
jet fuel. What is clear is that the presence of aircraft fuel resulted in a 
generalized fire on the floors of impact. The subsequent burning was entertained 
by the aircraft remnants and by the fuel inherent to the building. In this 
particular case, the fuel load consisted mostly of furniture and partitions. Data 
on these type of fuels is available (www.bfr.nist.gov) and indicates no unusual 
energy release rates. However, the exact nature of the fuel load on the floors has 
not been determined so far. 
It has bee pointed out [17] that comparison between the images of the 
WTC and those of the First Interstate Bank fire (Los Angeles), show for the 
latter case, greater heating effects over larger regions. Furthermore, the author 
points out that complete widow breakage did not seem evident in WTC as 
occurred in 1st Interstate. In an important point, the author of this report, uses the 
Cardington Tests as an example of such fire conditions that appeared more 
severe and did not lead to measured temperatures above 700 °C. The Cardington 
Tests are the most recent and best-documented study that attempts to better 
understand the behavior of steel frame structures under generalized fire 
conditions. The information from these tests, the subsequent modeling and the 
lessons learned should be used when trying to understand the behavior of the 
fire and structure in the WTC. 
3.2. The High Rise 
Before analyzing the specific building it is important to establish what are 
the constraints imposed by high-rise buildings. In this section it will be accepted 
that the building has to include, as part of the design constraints, a scenario 
equal or similar to that of September 11th, 2002. 
It is clear that as the height of the building increases the time to evacuate 
the occupants will increase. Several methodologies can be used to estimate the 
evacuation time and they will all point out to the conclusion that evacuation of a 
floor (or a limited number of floors) to an adjacent area is feasible within the 
characteristic times corresponding to the fire reaching non-tenable conditions. 
 15
Further evacuation can then proceed under the assumption that the time for loss 
of structural integrity is much larger than the total evacuation time. Different fire 
conditions produce different results. This is graphic from the 1993-bombing 
incident at the WTC that produced non-lethal smoke that obscured vision and 
retarded egress considerably. But in the September 11th incident, evacuation 
below the floors of impact was very successful. There are currently about 4 
uncoordinated studies on the evacuation of the towers in the September 11th 
case. 
For a scenario of the nature of the one being analyzed here, the loss of a 
specific region of the building and of its occupants will have to be accepted and 
design will have to concentrate in minimizing live loss and damage beyond the 
area of impact. For this scenario it will have to be assumed that the time interval 
to reach untenable conditions within the region of impact cannot be managed by 
any form of escape protocol. 
The present scenario implies the loss of active and passive fire protection 
systems within the area of origin, therefore structural behavior needs to be 
addressed in the absence of these features. Furthermore, as the elevation of the 
area of impact increases the efficacy of firemen intervention decreases 
significantly. This leads to a worse case scenario where firemen intervention 
could be eliminated from the design specifications. The limitations on firemen 
intervention in high-rise buildings have been known for years and are discussed 
by Chief Vincent Dunn [21]. In the April 2002 issue of Firehouse, he calls for 
many improvements in the fire service. These include a new radio, a tracking 
system for fire fighters, robots and helicopters for suppression, and improved 
breathing equipment. 
In summary, as a building increases in height and the conditions approach 
those of the World Trade Center event, its design will tend to a worst case 
scenario where the building needs to be designed on the basis of: 
• Structural integrity of the area of origin needs to be achieved in 
the absence of any form of fire control and passive protection for 
a time that tends to infinity (tS→∞). 
• Structural integrity of the rest of the building needs to be 
achieved under the same principles as above (tS→∞), although 
passive protection systems can be assumed to remain in place. 
The reliability of active suppression systems under the present 
conditions would have to be assessed in great detail. In a similar 
manner, firemen intervention within areas beyond the origin can 
be considered nevertheless, it needs to be weighted on the basis 
of the elevation. 
• Smoke management and escape need to be designed on the basis 
that only local evacuation is possible within the time duration of 
the fire. 
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3.3 The Issues Presented by the WTC Incident 
The questions raised above where never stated within the constraints of 
the World Trade center design and subsequent improvements and the ultimate 
fate of he WTC buildings was collapse. Three high-rise buildings collapsed 
including the 42 story WTC 7 that was ignited and damaged by the falling 
towers. This turn of events leads to the unavoidable question of what induced 
the collapse and furthermore, what modifications in building design philosophy 
are necessary to achieve the goals stated in the previous section. This issue has 
raised great speculation and this paper will not attempt to add to it. Instead it is 
the intention of the authors to point what questions need to be raised to achieve 
better understanding of what determined the final fate of these buildings and 
their occupants. It is appearing that the fire was the principal reason for the 
collapse after the impact. But the circumstances of that cause are unknown. 
Over-simplified initial analysis of the impact and subsequent fire seemed 
to point out that that collapse could have been a foreseeable event. More detailed 
evaluations seem to point in the opposite direction. It is apparent that at this 
point no one can establish in detail the sequence of events that could lead to the 
collapse of such buildings. 
It is well recognized that no one single event or design feature is 
responsible for the generalized destruction of the building nevertheless, the 
different issues involved can be raised. The structural elements are questioned 
on two different bases, their capability of withstanding the impact and their 
resistance to a long duration fire. Separation of the particular implications of 
each of these two sources of damage at this point is impossible. Attempts to 
isolate the different elements that are being questioned will be made, and in 
some cases tentative answers will be presented, at least to indicate possible 
approaches. 
1. The airplanes inflicted sever damage on the façade columns. The fraction 
of these columns that was damaged should be precisely determined and 
compared to an analysis of the resulting strength of the building as a 
function of a reduction of the structural elements of the outer core. 
Based on the leaked FEMA report to the NY Times, it appears that the 
outside columns did not experience an increase in load. The internal 
damage needs to be evaluated. The same NY Times article states that 
building would have stood indefinitely had there been no fire. 
2. The aircraft would have damaged the inner core of the building. An 
estimation of the magnitude of this damage should be made and, again, 
compared to an analysis of the resulting strength of the building as a 
function of a reduction of the strength of the inner core. 
No information on the inner core has been reported. It appears that 
computer modeling will be eventually used. However, impact-scale 
modeling might be an alternative. 
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3. It is clear that if all the structural elements of a floor are eliminated, the 
floors above will collapse over it. It is essential to establish if a single 
floor failure will lead to progressive collapse of the entire building. 
Progressive collapse is a well-known process [22,23]. 
Connections of the floors to the outer columns has been a focal point of 
speculation. 
4. A realistic description of the fire needs to be made and should include a 
detailed evaluation of the impact of the aircraft fuel on the ultimate size of 
the fire. Isolating the aircraft fuel from the subsequent fire is essential 
since it will allow separating this particular event from other more 
probable scenarios that could lead to a generalized fire within the 
building. 
Our preliminary assessment attempts to sort out the fuel and fire effects 
will be presented in the final section of this paper simply as an example of 
a possible analysis. 
5. A detailed evaluation of the ventilation patterns, flames projected from 
the windows, external plume is essential in establishing the amount of 
oxygen that can reach the fire. As shown in previous sections, a simple 
calculation of the available ventilation areas will show that the size of this 
fire is most likely limited by ventilation. 
The inability to completely model this fire makes it essential to examine 
available video and photographic records to create a demographic time-
line. 
6. Within the fire service community there is a generalized lack of 
confidence on the behavior of lightweight trusses. Furthermore, a number 
of preliminary reports have suggested that the joints between these trusses 
and the external core are the initial point of failure. The impact of the fire 
on these elements seems to be a recurrent point of discussion that needs to 
be investigated in detail [21]. 
7.  “Fireproofing” as a mechanism of fire protection for structural elements 
has been long required. It has been pointed out that faulty fireproofing 
might have accelerated the collapse process (NY Times, December 13th, 
2001). Fireproofing is advocated on the basis of standards such as ASTM-
E-119 (ISO-834) that rely on a pre-specified environment temperature to 
quantify the evolution of the temperatures within structural elements. 
Criticism to this methodology is common within the fire community. 
Some researchers even advocate that the absence of fireproofing might be 
beneficial to a structure in the event of generalized fire. The temperatures 
expected in a post flashover fire will lead to deformation of a structure, 
albeit not to failure. The deformation leads to redistribution of loads that 
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could be of benefit to the overall resistance of the structure [26]. In any 
event the role of the insulation for fire protection needs to be critically 
studied in this incident. 
3.4 Sample Calculations for the WTC Scenario 
The Effect of the Aircraft Fuel 
Each plane is estimated to have had 10,000 gallons of jet fuel on board at 
impact. Based on the asymptotic burning rate for JP-4 [24, p.3-201] of 60 g/m2-
s, we obtain a total burning rate of 242 g/s if it burns homogeneously over the 
entire floor. For 10,000 gal., this is approximately 28,500 kg. About four 
fireballs of roughly 60 m in diameter resulted from a jet impact. The mass (M) 




Or about 9,400 kg per impact. The burning duration of the remaining fuel 
over one floor is 
 
t = (28,500-9,400)/242 = 79 s. 
 
Hence, the jet fuel fire was short lived.  Indeed, all did not burn above 
since accounts have pointed that fuel spilled down the elevator shafts, burning 
people in the lobby. 
 
The Impact of The building contents 
We do not know, at this time, exactly what the demographics of the office 
spaces involved in fire. The Japanese building code designs to 560 MJ/m2, but 
office space can vary considerably, especially in storage areas. Let us use the 
CIB correlations for wood-based fuel established in Thomas and Heselden [5]. 
Furthermore, at this time, the state of the openings on a floor has not fully been 
determined. Nevertheless, it is roughly estimated that 50 % of the building side 
at impact was opened with about 30 more additional windows broken. This 
gives AoHo1/2 is 252 m5/2. The surface area (per CIB: walls and ceiling) might 
be about 5000 m2, neglecting partitions and the core utility space. This gives A/ 
AoHo1/2 = 20 m–1/2. 
Using a 50 % variance, this gives a range on the CIB correlations in 
Figure 16 and Figure 17. Note that Figure 16 and Figure 17 were previously 
presented as part of the background. The results indicate temperatures of 800 to 
1000 °C, and a burning rate of about 15 to 30 kg/s. As mentioned before, it is 
quite possible that the temperature could have exceeded those values estimated 
here. 
For wood (15 MJ/kg) at 560 MJ/m2, the burning duration of the office 
furniture can then be estimated at about 86 to 171 minutes. The towers collapsed 
in 56 and 104 minutes. 
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Figure 17 shows the estimated maximum temperature in the WTC office 
floors in comparison with the ISO 834 temperature curve. From the collapse 
times, the temperatures corresponding to the test are within the error of those 
estimated. It can be therefore argued that protection on the steel members was 
not adequate. The uncertainty, nevertheless, can go both ways, since the 
temperature could have been well in excess of ISO 834 or the values predicted 
here, or the uncertainty can be related to lack (or poor) of insulation due to the 
impact or original state of the protection. The actual state of the fire proofing at 
the time of impact is not known. 
 
Figure 15 Temperature from CIB [5]. 
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Figure 17 Estimation of WTC floor temperatures and ISO 834. 
4. What Should Have Been Done – Final Comments 
When this terrorist attack occurred, its shock and magnitude brought out 
many emotions and actions. The call for an investigation of the collapse of the 
WTC buildings (2·110 story towers and WTC 7, 48 stories) was not one of 
them. Investigative agencies, such as the BATF or the NTSB, were not in the 
forefront. The responsibility for action went to the City of NY and the FBI. The 
ASCE stepped forward with a voluntary team that took about a month to get 
access to the site, and FEMA funded the ASCE to continue their investigation—
called a building performance study. NIST stepped forward to propose action 
but has yet to be funded. The steel members were recycled and valuable 
evidence may have been lost. The NY Times (April 8, 2002) presented a story 
on questioning the standard furnace test for structural members. Underwriters 
Laboratories (UL) responded in a Letter-to-the-NY-Times-Editor (April 
15,2002): “The World Trade Center stood for almost an hour after withstanding 
conditions well beyond those experience in any typical fire. …UL’s testing 
procedures helped make that possible.” Whether this fire was atypical and how 
does it relate to the test method needs to be fully answered. Three high-rise 
buildings received structural damage leading to collapse at the WTC; two were 
hit by aircraft and they seems to have not damaged the buildings sufficient for 
collapse. The Meridan Plaza high-rise fire also led to a structure being damaged 
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in an office building fire. Fire events are rare, and our standards are absolute, 
and in these cases not based on science. It seems obvious to us that we cannot 
afford to rely on an empirical basis for fire safety. Hopefully, this tragic event 
will catalyze those in fire safety to take a deep look at what they are doing, and 
seek to obtain assured fire safety levels through engineering analysis and data. 
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